Attacks on Fixed Apparatus Quantum Key Distribution Schemes by Boyer, Michel et al.
Attacks on Fixed Apparatus Quantum Key Distribution Schemes
Michel Boyer,1 Ran Gelles,2 and Tal Mor3
1De´partement IRO, Universite´ de Montre´al (Que´bec), Canada
2Computer Science Department, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
3Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa, Israel
We consider quantum key distribution implementations in which the receiver’s apparatus is fixed and
does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical
quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong
eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver’s equipment. The attack we present here,
the “fixed-apparatus attack” causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.
I. Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is
probably the best known application of quantum cryptogra-
phy, for it has already given rise to commercial implemen-
tations for securing communications. In most QKD pro-
tocols a sender (Alice), prepares non orthogonal quantum
states to be measured by the receiver (Bob). The security of
the transmission is in principle guaranteed by the fact that
an eavesdropper cannot spy the state being sent without in-
ducing errors and be detected. Such protocols comprise the
BB84 protocol [1], the B92 protocol [2], a six-state proto-
col [3], etc.
Given a mathematical description of the BB84 protocol,
its security can indeed be proven rigorously [4–9]. Its phys-
ical implementations may nevertheless be insecure; for in-
stance if states are encoded as photon pulses, critical se-
curity problems emerge from pulses containing two pho-
tons [10].
It was generally taken for granted that if sources whose
states are all ideal qubits in H2 could be guaranteed, so
would be the security of BB84 implementations. Re-
searchers then understood that this is not the case, the prob-
lem now is lying on the receiver’s side. Let HA be the
Hilbert space corresponding to those states |ϕ〉 Alice sends
to Bob according to their protocol. The eavesdropper (Eve)
may send Bob states in a Hilbert space larger thanHA and
by doing so, alter the assumed behavior of his device. See
the fake-state attack [11], the Trojan pony attack [12, 13],
and the reversed-space attack [14, 15]. This problem is in-
herent when using photons, since even if Alice sends an
ideal qubit, each pulse can potentially contain less than or
more than a single photon and be shifted in time (space,
frequency), hence her ideal spaceH2 is merely a subspace
of a larger Hilbert space potentially exploitable by Eve.
II. The Fixed-Apparatus Attack.1 Protocols (in particu-
lar BB84) require Bob to make random choices. In BB84
this choice is between measuring in the computation ba-
sis or in the Hadamard basis. This can also be described
as randomly choosing a unitary transformation (either the
identity or the Hadamard transformation) followed by a
1 A preliminary version of this work appeared in [16].
fixed measurement in the computation basis. That random
choice is Bob’s input to the protocol. In most automated
QKD implementations, a random number generator or a
pseudo random number generator is used by Bob for gen-
erating his random input. However, to guarantee a faster
bit-rate in some implementations, those random choices
are made by the measurement itself. Indeed, apparata for
which there is no (random) input from Bob have been pro-
posed and implemented in the literature [17–27]. Such an
apparatus, with no (random) input from Bob, is what we
call a “fixed apparatus”; it simply gives outputs.
A simple behavior of Bob’s fixed-apparatus procedure
can be described as follows. When Alice sends some
state |ϕ〉 ∈HA, Bob adds an ancillary state |0〉anc ∈Hanc
and performs a measurement, in the computation basis,
of UB|ϕ〉A|0〉anc, whereHB =HA⊗Hanc and UB :HB→
HB is a unitary. If Eve has secret access toHanc, nothing
prevents her from generating a state inHB instead of send-
ing a state inHA, and Bob may be unable to notice or pre-
vent it due to the fact that his apparatus is fixed. Then, each
state |r〉 ∈HB measured by Bob can be “reversed in time”
to yield a specific state U†B|r〉 inHA⊗Hanc that, if gener-
ated by Eve and given to Bob as input, results in Bob mea-
suring exactly the state |r〉. Hence, once Eve controlsHanc
andHA, she has full control on Bob’s measured states.
This type of an attack is a special case of the reversed-
space attack [14, 15], in which Eve performs her attack on
a larger space, obtained by using the time reversal symme-
try of quantum theory [28, 29]. Note that Eve only sends
information into Bob’s lab but is not getting information
out of it, thus it is also a special type of a Trojan Pony at-
tack [12, 13].
In a more realistic case which is particularly relevant
when the quantum carriers are photons, the space HA
spanned by Alice’s states is a subspace of a larger
space H˜A, which also contains basis states corresponding
to a vacuum pulse (0 photons) or pulses with two or more
photons, or pulses sent shifted in time, etc. Similarly, we
can consider a photonic space H˜anc that includes the an-
cillary space added by Bob. The choice of the two enclos-
ing spaces H˜A and H˜anc is somewhat arbitrary (namely
Eve has a lot of freedom in defining them), as long as they
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2are large enough so that H˜A⊗H˜anc contains U†B|r〉 for any
state |r〉 measured by Bob.
Such “inclusions” of spaces within larger spaces need
merely be unitary embeddings (isometries) i.e. linear maps
preserving inner products; thus, we assume the “inclu-
sion” IA :HA → H˜A is an isometry. Also Ianc : H˜A →
H˜A⊗H˜anc defined by Ianc|ϕ〉= |ϕ〉|0〉anc and correspond-
ing to attaching an ancilla is a unitary embedding: it is lin-
ear and preserves inner products. When I :H1 →H2 is
a unitary embedding, the subspace I(H1) ofH2 spanned
by all I|ϕ〉 for |ϕ〉 inH1 is such that II†|ψ〉= |ψ〉 for all
states |ψ〉 in I(H1).
Let us summarize the process (see Table I): Alice sends
states from |ϕ〉 ∈ HA to Bob, who obtains I|ϕ〉 where
I :HA→ H˜A⊗H˜anc is the embedding defined by I|ϕ〉=
IancIA|ϕ〉. Bob processes I|ϕ〉 using a unitary map
UB : H˜A ⊗ H˜anc → H˜A ⊗ H˜anc, and then he performs a
complete measurement of a space HB ⊆ H˜A⊗ H˜anc in a
publicly known basis B. Quite often, for simplicity, we
only care about the operation of UB on a subspace H˜
of H˜A⊗ H˜anc such that I(HA) ⊆ H˜ (HA is embedded
in H˜ ) and H RB ≡ U†(HB) ⊆ H˜ (all “reversed states”
fromHB are in H˜ ).
Space Meaning
HA The span of Alice’s States
HB The space measured by Bob
H˜A
∗A “realistic” space that includesHA
H˜anc ∗An ancillary space added by Bob
H˜ The space on which Bob’s transformation is relevant
H RB The “reversal” of Bob’s measured space
∗ There is a degree of freedom in choosing H˜ and H˜A and H˜anc under
the constraint thatHA is embedded in H˜ andH RB ⊆ H˜ ⊆ H˜A⊗H˜anc.
TABLE I. The Various Relevant Spaces
If Eve knows about H˜A (which is always prone to her
attack) and can access H˜anc then nothing prevents her from
generating any state of her choice in H˜A⊗H˜anc instead of
sending a state inHA. This leads to our attack.
Theorem 1 (fixed-apparatus attack) If for all basis states
|r〉 of a given basis B of HB, Eve can produce a state
|r〉R ∈H RB ≡ U†B(HB) such that Bob processes and mea-
sures UB|r〉R = |r〉, then she can get full information of
Bob’s measured outcomes without changing their statistics.
Proof. Note that Eve knows the operation of UB (due to
knowing Bob’s setup). Eve captures the incoming state |ϕ〉
and applies the same measurement as Bob on UBI|ϕ〉, get-
ting |r〉 ∈B. She then sends Bob the state |r〉R. Bob applies
UB to |r〉R which produces the state |r〉 on which Bob’s
complete measurement in the basis B yields |r〉, the same
value obtained by Eve. 
Note that even though Eve’s measurement outcome is
not always identical to what Alice sent, Eve’s information
is always identical to Bob’s, and whenever Alice and Bob
have a matching basis, all of them hold the same bit value.
Application: an attack on a polarization-based scheme.
Polarization-based QKD is realized by many experiments
(e.g. [30–33] and references therein), some of which [18–
23] suffer from the above weakness. Specifically, we now
analyze an implementation of a polarization-based BB84,
based on polarization beamsplitters (PBS). Each qubit sent
by Alice either has a horizontal/vertical polarization (the
+ basis), or a diagonal polarization, i.e., ±45◦ (the × ba-
sis). In the standard implementation Bob randomly choses
whether to measure each arriving qubit using the + basis
setup, or the rotated setup. The measurement itself is im-
plemented using two PBSs: one separates horizontal po-
larization from a vertical one and the other separates +45◦
from −45◦ (say, via a polarization rotator that rotates the
photon’s polarization by 45◦).
FIG. 1. A fixed apparatus for polarization-based BB84.
PIBS=polarization independent beam splitter, PBS=polarization
beam splitter, PR=polarization rotator.
In a fixed-apparatus implementation, Bob’s apparatus
(outlined in Fig. 1) is such that both PBSs are connected
to the channel via a standard (polarization independent)
beamsplitter (PIBS), with one blocked input arm [18–23].
In this case, Alice’s qubit |ϕ〉 ∈HA =H2 is sent over the
channel (arm a) while a vacuum ancilla is implicitly added
by the blocked arm of the PIBS (arm b). The embedding
ofHA into the (a–b) inputs system of the PIBS is given by
I|ϕ〉 = |ϕ〉a|V 〉b, where |V 〉 denotes an empty (vacuum)
pulse.
We arbitrarily choose a specific embedding into 9-
dimensional space, I : HA → H˜A ⊗ H˜anc, and we shall
soon see that it is the minimal possible embedding contain-
ingHB: H˜A is spanned by {|V 〉a, |↔〉a, | ↕ 〉a} correspond-
ing to a vacuum state, horizontal and vertical polarization,
respectively. Similarly H˜anc is the span of the basis states
{|V 〉b, |↔〉b, | ↕ 〉b}.
Bob’s transformation UB in this simple example is
3merely the PIBS, transferring the (a–b) input system into
the (c–d) output system, along with the PR, and is well de-
fined on H˜A⊗ H˜anc. We only need to care about pulses
with at most a single photon, thus (for |ϕ〉 a polarization
qubit) we can let H˜ = {|ϕ〉a|V 〉b, |V 〉a|ϕ〉b, |V 〉a|V 〉b},
a five dimensional subspace of the 9-dimensional space
H˜A⊗ H˜anc. The transformation for states in H˜ is given
by
UB|ϕ〉a|V 〉b = 1√
2
[
|ϕ〉c|V 〉d + i|V 〉cPR|ϕ〉d
]
UB|V 〉a|ϕ〉b = 1√
2
[
i|ϕ〉c|V 〉d + |V 〉cPR|ϕ〉d
] (1)
as well as UB|V 〉a|V 〉b = |V 〉c|V 〉d . We could furthermore
remove the |V 〉a|V 〉b state from H˜ with no influence on the
result. The polarization rotation is given by PR|⤡〉= |↔〉
and PR|⤢〉= eiθ | ↕ 〉.
Bob’s spaceHB is the four-dimensional space defined by
the four orthogonal states measured by the four detectors.
Using our knowledge of UB, we can “reverse” each one of
the four basis states |r〉 ∈HB measured by Bob, and obtain
|r〉R ∈ H˜ . Bob’s reversed spaceH RB is the space spanned
by the four states |r〉R presented in Table II. See Section A
in the Supplemental Material for full details.
m |r〉 |r〉R = U†B|r〉
(+,0) |↔〉c|V 〉d ( |↔〉a|V 〉b− i|V 〉a|↔〉b)/√2
(+,1) | ↕ 〉c|V 〉d ( | ↕ 〉a|V 〉b− i|V 〉a| ↕ 〉b)/√2
(×,0) |V 〉c|↔〉d (−i|⤡〉a|V 〉b+ |V 〉a|⤡〉b)/√2
(×,1) eiθ |V 〉c| ↕ 〉d (−i|⤢〉a|V 〉b+ |V 〉a|⤢〉b)/√2
TABLE II. Bob’s measured states and their reversal
In order to have full control on Bob’s spaceHB, all Eve
has to do is to access arm b of the beamsplitter (that is
supposed to be blocked). By generating |r〉R not only does
Eve choose which arm the photon goes to (arm c or arm d)
but also which detector clicks.
The above attack can be generalized to any QKD or
quantum cryptography setting in which a beamsplitter is
used for replacing Bob’s true choice of basis. Note that
in the above example, we could have chosen H˜ =H RB =
HB. This is not true in general.
III. The Fixed-Apparatus Attack on a non-trivial re-
versed space. In a more general case, for instance when
using Mach-Zehnder interferometer as we show below, the
operation applied by Bob (after the embeddings) is not de-
scribed by a unitary operator on H˜A ⊗ H˜anc. Bob’s ap-
paratus however always acts linearly on input states and
preserves inner products: it thus gives rise to an isometry
(unitary embedding). In such cases, an extension of Theo-
rem 1 is needed.
Let us denote IB this embedding replacing UB; it is de-
fined on some space H˜ ⊆ H˜A⊗ H˜anc, and it can be de-
ϕ
(d)
(c) (c)
s arm
d arm
(f)
(e) (e)
a arm
b arm
t ′1 t
′
0 t2 t0
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t0
FIG. 2. A Mach-Zehnder interferometer. An input qubit enters
from the a arm while a vacuum ancilla is added by arm b. (c)
beamsplitters; (d) phase shifter Pϕ ; (e) mirrors; (f) six output
modes.
duced from Bob’s setup. Because IB is fully defined by
Bob’s apparatus (similarly to UB in the earlier section), it is
known to Eve. We (and Eve) choose H˜ to “contain”HA,
to “contain” relevant vacuum ancilas that Bob adds, to be
minimal, and yet to be such that HB ⊆ IB(H˜ ) which
implies that for each state |r〉 measured by Bob, there is
unique state |r〉R in H˜ (namely |r〉R = I†B|r〉) such thatIB(|r〉R) = |r〉. As before, the span of all states |r〉 isHB.
The span of all states |r〉R is nowH RB = I†B(HB).
Theorem 2 (generalized fixed-apparatus attack) If for all
basis states |r〉 of a given basis B of HB, Eve can pro-
duce a state |r〉R ∈H RB ⊆ H˜ defined above, such that Bob
processes and measures IB|r〉R = |r〉, then she can get full
information of Bob’s measured outcomes without changing
their statistics.
Proof. Eve captures the incoming state |ϕ〉 and applies the
same measurement as Bob on IBI|ϕ〉, getting some |r〉
in B. She then sends Bob |r〉R. Bob applies IB to it which
produces the state |r〉, i.e. Bob’s complete measurement
will yield |r〉, the same value obtained by Eve. 
Application: an attack on Interferometric-based
scheme. Our second interesting example for a fixed-
apparatus setting which suffers from the fixed-apparatus
attack is interferometric QKD, realized via a Mach Zehn-
der interferometer (Fig. 2). The most common interfero-
metric realization is for BB84 with x and y bases [34] (see
also [33, 35–37]), in which Bob changes the phase ϕ of the
phase-shifter according to the basis he wishes to measure
(see, e.g., [15] for a detailed description of this setting).
However, motivated by the need to increase the key rate
and other reasons2, fixed implementations of BB84 with x
2 Measuring the z basis might be required, for instance, in order to im-
plement the 6-state QKD protocol [3], in which Alice sends a qubit
using the x, y and z bases at random; or in order to perform “QKD
with classical Bob” [38–40] in which one party is restricted to use
only the (classical) z-basis, and either performs measurements in that
basis or returns the qubits (unchanged) to the other party.
4and z bases were suggested and implemented as well [24–
27, 33]. At each transmission, Alice sends a single pho-
ton in a superposition of two time-modes |t ′0〉 ≡ |0〉 and|t ′1〉 ≡ |1〉. Bob fixes the phase shift ϕ to the x-basis and
performs a complete measurement of the space. Later Al-
ice reveals the basis she used. When the x basis is used
Bob ignores clicks at time t0 and t2 as those measurements
are inconclusive. Similarly, when the z basis is used, Bob
ignores clicks at t1.
Now that the apparatus is fixed, the implementation suf-
fers from our attack (Theorem 2). As in the case of
polarization-based BB84, one of the interferometer’s in-
put arms is assumed to be blocked, and if this is not the
case then the scheme is totally insecure:3 each one of the
states Bob may detect can be “reversed in time” yielding a
superposition of single-photon states (of four modes at the
interferometer inputs) that Eve can generate.
While the action of the interferometer can be mathemat-
ically defined on a space including pulses with more than
a single photon, we only care about states with at most
one photon. In order to properly describe our setting, we
consider 6 time-modes corresponding to times t ′−2, . . . , t
′
3
where each “time mode” contains either a single photon
or zero photons and denote |t ′n〉a the state with 1 photon at
time t ′n and 0 at other times in arm a; |V 〉a denotes the state
with 0 photon at all 6 times. The space H˜A is then taken
to be the span of the states |V 〉a, |t ′−1〉a, . . . , |t ′2〉a. Similarly
to what we saw in Section II, also here we let H˜anc con-
tain more states than just the vacuum. It is spanned by the
states |V 〉b, |t ′−1〉b, . . . , |t ′2〉b of arm b. Since we only need
to care about pulses with at most a single photon we define
the space H˜ to be the span of the states |V 〉ab = |V 〉a|V 〉b,
|t ′n〉a|V 〉b and |V 〉a|t ′n〉b, for −1≤ n≤ 2.
Due to space constraints, we use the following notations:
|an〉 ≡ |t ′n〉a|V 〉b, |bn〉 ≡ |V 〉a|t ′n〉b; similarly for the outputs
at times tn, we let |sn〉 ≡ |tn〉s|V 〉d and |dn〉 ≡ |V 〉s|tn〉d . The
action of the interferometer on H˜ can then be described
by the following equations:
IB|an〉= (|sn〉− |sn+1〉+ i|dn〉+ i|dn+1〉)/2
IB|bn〉= i(|sn〉+ |sn+1〉+ i|dn〉− i|dn+1〉)/2 , (2)
and IB|V 〉ab = |V 〉sd . While H˜ and IB(H˜ ) are of dimen-
sion 9, the output states |V 〉sd , |s−1〉, |s0〉, |s1〉, |s2〉, |s3〉,
|d−1〉, |d0〉, |d1〉, |d2〉, |d3〉 generate a space of dimension 11
(with some non zero occupancy numbers at time t3 whereas
all occupancy numbers for |an〉 and |bn〉 at times t ′−2 and t ′3
are 0). Recall that Bob measures the six basis states |s0〉,
|s1〉, |s2〉, |d0〉, |d1〉, |d2〉 depicted in Fig. 1. Using Eq. (7)
it is easy to check that for each state |r〉 of Table III, the
equality IB|r〉R = |r〉 holds. Bob’s reversed space H RB is
3 It was shown that such a scheme might not be fully secure even when
the second input arm is blocked [15].
the span of those states |r〉R. If Eve is capable of generat-
ing and sending the states |r〉R she fully breaks the protocol
(Theorem 2). For full details on how Table III is derived,
see Section B in the Supplemental Material.
m |r〉 |r〉R
(z,0) |s0〉 (|a0〉− |a−1〉− i|b0〉− i|b−1〉)/2
(z,0) i|d0〉 (|a0〉+ |a−1〉− i|b0〉+ i|b−1〉)/2
(x,1) |s1〉 (|a1〉− |a0〉− i|b1〉− i|b0〉)/2
(x,0) i|d1〉 (|a1〉+ |a0〉− i|b1〉+ i|b0〉)/2
(z,1) |s2〉 (|a2〉− |a1〉− i|b2〉− i|b1〉)/2
(z,1) i|d2〉 (|a2〉+ |a1〉− i|b2〉+ i|b1〉)/2
TABLE III. Bob’s measured states and their reversal.
IV. The Fixed-Apparatus Attack when Bob combines
several outcomes. Table III contains an additional column
for m. When Bob measures either |s0〉 or |d0〉 (for imple-
menting BB84), he draws the same conclusion: “basis z”
and “bit 0”. If after getting any of those two measurements
Eve sends Bob the state |ψz,0〉 = 1√2 [|a0〉 − i|b0〉], then
IB|ψz,0〉 = 1√2 [|s0〉+ i|d0〉] so Bob still measures |s0〉 or
|d0〉 with equal probability and gets the same result (z,0).
Similarly, if Eve sends Bob the state |ψz,1〉 = 1√2 [|a1〉+
i|b1〉] when she measures either |s2〉 or |d2〉, Bob measures
|s2〉 or |d2〉 with equal probability and concludes the same
result (z,1).
The attack of this section is simpler and more practi-
cal compared to the attack based on the 6 states |r〉R of
Table III as now all pulses sent by Eve are at times t ′0 and t
′
1,
exactly the times used by Alice. Note that if Alice and Bob
modify their protocol and add detectors also on time slots
t ′−1 and t
′
−2 (or add shutters on the input arm a) and ver-
ify statistics, this will help them to prevent Eve’s attack of
Section III, yet not that of Section IV.
If M is the set of outputs m, and µ :B→M is the function
that associates to each basis state the corresponding m in M,
a general statement can be stated as follows:
Theorem 3 If for all m ∈ M Eve can produce a state
|m〉R ∈ H˜ such that the state IB|m〉R is in the span of
{|r〉 ∈ B | µ(r) = m}, then she can get full information of
Bob’s measured outcomes without changing their statistics.
This theorem assumes Bob checks only the outputs in M;
the statistics of individual basis measurements in the ba-
sis B, in general, may not be preserved.
Note that a similar (and even simpler) extension applies
to the simple case of Theorem 1, in which Bob’s setting is
a unitary operator (UB) rather than an isometry.
V. Conclusions. Theorems 1–3 apply to several QKD
experiments in which a fixed-apparatus is used by Bob,
such as [18–27]. We stress that we don’t claim these im-
plementations to be insecure. Rather, we point out weak-
points of such realizations. Namely, they are insecure
only against a very strong eavesdropper. A similar attack
5is potentially possible whenever the space Bob measures
for the z-basis is orthogonal to the space he measures for
the x-basis (which is always the case in fixed-apparatus
schemes).
The attacks we present require Eve to have one-time ac-
cess to Bob’s device, e.g., to drill a small hole in Bob’s
device, right where the other input of the beamsplitter (as-
sumed to be blocked) is located; or to wire the other arm
into the channel, using some time-multiplexing. If Eve is
some technician or service person that has one time access
to Bob’s lab, or if Alice and Bob purchase their devices
from Eve4, the device may be compromised.
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6SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
A. ATTACKS ON FIXED-APPARATUS
POLARIZATION-BASED BB84
In this section we demonstrate the power of the reversed
attack on a fixed apparatus by devising an attack on a very
simple (yet common) setup of the BB84 scheme, based on
polarized photons. We begin by describing the setup and
the protocol over the setup and then move on to describing
Eve’s attack.
1. Polarized photons and Fock notations
In polarization-based BB84, each qubit is implemented
via a single photon which either has a horizontal/vertical
polarization (the + basis with basis states |↔〉 and | ↕ 〉),
or a diagonal polarization, i.e., ±45◦ (the × basis, with
basis states |⤡〉 and |⤢〉).
With the Fock state notations (which we denote using a
ket with an ‘F’ superscript), a polarized photon is described
using two modes corresponding to orthogonal polarization
states, where the first mode corresponds to horizontal po-
larization and the second mode to vertical one. Hence,
|↔〉 ≡ |10〉F (one horizontally polarized photon, zero verti-
cally polarized photon), and | ↕ 〉 ≡ |01〉F. An arbitrary po-
larization state |ϕ〉 of a single photon is written using the
computation basis as |ϕ〉 = α|↔〉+ β | ↕ 〉 or using Fock
notations as |ϕ〉F = α|10〉F +β |01〉F. In addition to the case
of a pulse with a single photon described above, we use
|V 〉 ≡ |00〉F to denote a pulse with zero photons (a vacuum
state).
While it is important to keep the Fock notations in mind,
they become a bit cumbersome. We can actually do well
without them in this section because the physical situation
we deal with is relatively simple. In the following we use
both notations interchangeably to describe Bob’s appara-
tus, however we will use the standard notations for describ-
ing the relevant spaces and our fixed-apparatus attack on
this setting.
2. Bob’s setup
Bob’s setup contains beam splitters of two types, polar-
ization rotators, and detectors. See Fig. 1. We now derive
the transformation UB induced by his equipment.
The matrix describing the unitary transformation applied
by a 50%/50% beam splitter (BS) is
BS =
1√
2
[
1 i
i 1
]
(3)
meaning that a transmitted particle gets no phase and a re-
flected particle gets the phase i. This implies the following
transformation for a single particle:
|1〉Fa|0〉Fb 7→
1√
2
[ |1〉Fc|0〉Fd + i|0〉Fc|1〉Fd]
|0〉Fa|1〉Fb 7→
1√
2
[
i|1〉Fc|0〉Fd + |0〉Fc|1〉Fd
]
where a and b are the modes entering the beamsplitter and
c and d are the output modes (see, e.g., the PIBS in Fig. 1).
Next, we extend the discussion to also deal with the po-
larization of the single particle. A BS that does not change
polarization (a polarization-independent BS — PIBS) ap-
plies the transformation of Eq. (3) to either horizontally
polarized photon or vertically polarized photon, hence to
any polarization state |ϕ〉. With Fock-state notations the
PIBS acts as follows on a single photon having a known
polarization state:
PIBS|ϕ〉Fa|00〉Fb =
1√
2
[
|ϕ〉Fc|00〉Fd + i|00〉Fc|ϕ〉Fd
]
PIBS|00〉Fa|ϕ〉Fb =
1√
2
[
i|ϕ〉Fc|00〉Fd + |00〉Fc|ϕ〉Fd
]
,
and with standard qudit notation this is written as
PIBS|ϕ〉a|V 〉b = 1√
2
[
|ϕ〉c|V 〉d + i|V 〉c|ϕ〉d
]
PIBS|V 〉a|ϕ〉b = 1√
2
[
i|ϕ〉c|V 〉d + |V 〉c|ϕ〉d
]
.
Bob adds a polarization rotator PR on the d arm, whose
operation on the vacuum is the identity PR|V 〉 = |V 〉, and
on diagonally polarized states is
PR|⤡〉= |↔〉 ; PR|⤢〉= eiθ | ↕ 〉.
The phase θ is arbitrary and may be unknown to all parties
since it results in a global phase when Bob measures.
Therefore, Bob’s transformation UB from the input arms
to just before the measuring apparatus satisfies
UB|ϕ〉a|V 〉b = 1√
2
[
|ϕ〉c|V 〉d + i|V 〉cPR|ϕ〉d
]
UB|V 〉a|ϕ〉b = 1√
2
[
i|ϕ〉c|V 〉d + |V 〉cPR|ϕ〉d
]
.
(4)
Finally, the state reaches Bob’s measuring apparatus
which contains a polarization beam splitter (PBS) and a
detector on each arm (for each of the two bases). A PBS
is such that a |↔〉 (horizontally polarized) photon goes
through towards one detector, and a | ↕ 〉 (vertically po-
larized) photon is reflected towards the other detector. As
before, the transmitted photon gets no phase while the re-
flected photon gets an additional phase i.
For simplicity we assume that Bob’s detectors can dis-
tinguish zero photons, from one photon, and from more
than one, namely these detectors are perfect counters. As
a result, the protocol works fine when one and only one of
Bob’s detectors finds exactly one photon.
73. The embedding ofHA and the relevant spaces
The embedding ofHA into the (a–b) system is given by
I|ϕ〉= |ϕ〉Fa|00〉Fb, or without fock-state notations, I|ϕ〉=|ϕ〉a|V 〉b. Alice’s states are actually embedded into larger
spaces, but our aim here is to focus on the minimal space
required for proving the insecurity of the protocol. Let us
specify a relevant embedding space, the two polarization
modes of arm a limited to up to a single photon, which
span a space of dimension 3 which we denote H˜A, and the
additional two ancilla modes in Bob’s other input b limited
to up to a single photon, denoted H˜anc. The entire relevant
embedding space is thus the 9 dimensional space H˜A ⊗
H˜anc.
If we try to choose H˜A or H˜anc that contain less states,
then HB will be outside the space resulting from the ap-
plication of Bob’s setup onto Alice’s states. This is more
easily seen by the “reversed-space” analysis: if we begin
with a photon in one of Bob’s detector and ‘reverse’ the
direction the photon travels (i.e., assume it goes from the
detector and to the channel), it is possible that the photon
will go to arm b leaving a vacuum state in arm a. How-
ever, |V 〉a /∈HA and we must choose H˜A to include also a
vacuum state. By checking the reversed transformation on
the four outcome states, we see that H˜anc must also contain
three states, the vacuum and the two single-photon polar-
ization states.
We only need to care about pulses with at most
a single photon, thus we can let H˜ be the span of
{|ϕ〉a|V 〉b, |V 〉a|ϕ〉b, |V 〉a|V 〉b} for |ϕ〉 ∈ {|↔〉a, | ↕ 〉a}.
Thus, H˜ is a five dimensional subspace of the 9-
dimensional space H˜A⊗ H˜anc. Note that Bob’s transfor-
mation UB is well defined on H˜ using Eq. (4), along with
UB|V 〉a|V 〉b = |V 〉c|V 〉d .
4. Bob’s reversed space and Eve’s attack
Recall that Bob’s measured spaceHB is defined to be the
span of the 4 linear-independent states that cause his four
detectors to click with certainty. Those are,
Detector clicking State when
arriving at PBS
State just after
PIBS
+0 |↔〉c|V 〉d |↔〉c|V 〉d
+1 | ↕ 〉c|V 〉d | ↕ 〉c|V 〉d
×0 |V 〉c|↔〉d |V 〉c|⤡〉d
×1 eiθ |V 〉c| ↕ 〉d |V 〉c|⤢〉d
TABLE IV. Bob’s measured spaceHB
In order to get Bob’s reversed space, we need to apply
the complex conjugate of the PIBS matrix to the four or-
thogonal states in the right-hand column (state just after
PIBS) to get states in the input of the (a–b) system that are
relevant for Eve’s attack:
Detector clicking Input state forcing the click
+0 1√
2
[ |↔〉a|V 〉b− i|V 〉a|↔〉b]
+1 1√
2
[ | ↕ 〉a|V 〉b− i|V 〉a| ↕ 〉b]
×0 1√
2
[− i|⤡〉a|V 〉b+ |V 〉a|⤡〉b]
×1 1√
2
[− i|⤢〉a|V 〉b+ |V 〉a|⤢〉b]
TABLE V. Bob’s reversed measured spaceH RB
The above states are those that span the spaceH RB avail-
able for the eavesdropper attack. It is easy to verify that
indeed H RB ⊆ H˜ , since each of the above states is in the
span of {|ϕ〉a|V 〉b, |V 〉a|ϕ〉b, |V 〉a|V 〉b}, for |ϕ〉 a polariza-
tion qubit. This validates our choice for H˜ , and also sug-
gests that we could have omitted |V 〉a|V 〉b and obtain a
smaller H˜ .
B. ATTACKS ON FIXED-APPARATUS
INTERFEROMETRIC BB84
In this section we devise two fixed-apparatus attacks on a
BB84 implementation based on a Mach-Zehnder interfero-
meter. We begin by describing the setting and deriving the
transformation induced by Bob’s apparatus. Next we show
a fixed apparatus attack that uses Bob’s entire reversed
space (following Theorem 2). Finally, we devise an even
stronger fixed-apparatus attack (following Theorem 3),
which is restricted to a subspace of Bob’s reversed space
which corresponds to “valid” signals received by Alice.
1. The interferometer
Consider a BB84 implementation which uses two time-
separated modes (Fig. 3). For every transmission, the first
mode arrives to Bob’s lab at time t ′0, and the second mode
at t ′1 = t
′
0 +∆T on arm a. As in the previous section, we
can describe the number of particles in each mode using
Fock notations, |10〉Fa for a photon at time t ′0 and |01〉Fa for
a photon at time t ′1.
Assume a photon enters the interferometer at time t ′0 (i.e.,
the state |10〉Fa). After some fixed time T (i.e., at time t0 ≡
t ′0+T ), if it goes straight (s) through the two beam splitters,
it creates a pulse at the s output arm, and if reflected by the
second BS it goes down (d) and produces a pulse at the d
output arm. We also assume that the upper detour causes
a delay equal to ∆T , thus if the photon is reflected by the
first BS, it will produce a pulse at time t ′0+T +∆T at either
the s or d output arms. We denote the output times modes
as t0 = t ′0 + T and t1 = t
′
1 + T , etc. Note that due to the
8precise timing between consecutive input time modes and
the length of the detour in the interferometer, t ′0+T +∆T =
t1, which causes each output mode to be the interference of
two consecutive input time modes.
It follows that a photon in states |10〉Fa, |01〉Fa can end out
in one of 6 possible modes after the interferometer, these
correspond to times t0, t1, t2 in the s arm and in the d arm
denoted as |p0 p1 p2〉Fs|q0q1q2〉Fd where pn,qn are integers
denoting the occupancy of time tn in the respective arm.
Finally, it is known that every reflection on a beam splitter
(BS) produces a phase factor equal to i. For instance, if
|10〉Fa goes through the first BS and then is reflected by the
second BS, it ends in state i|000〉Fs|100〉Fd ; it can also be re-
flected by the first BS (phase factor i), be delayed ∆T by the
upper detour, go throughout the second BS (phase factor 1)
and then end in state i|000〉Fs|010〉Fd . Note that an additional
phase of i is added each time the photon is reflected from
a mirror. To compensate for these extra phases we add a
(fixed) phase-shift of pi and neglect the effect of the mir-
rors hereinafter.
pi
(d)
(c) (c)
s arm
d arm
(f)
(e) (e)
(a)
(b)
a1 a0
b0
b1
s2 s0
s1
d2
d1
d0
∆T
∆T
∆T detour
FIG. 3. A Mach-Zehnder interferometer. (a) An input qubit. The
time-difference between the two incoming modes is identical to
the difference between the two arms; (b) a vacuum state entering
the second arm; (c) beamsplitters; (d) ∆T time detour plus a phase
shift (to compensate phase shift done by mirrors); (e) mirrors; (f)
six output modes.
In a BB84 implementation that uses the x and z bases,
Alice and Bob encode the states as follows:
|0z〉 ≡ |10〉Fa |0x〉 ≡ (|10〉Fa+ |01〉Fa)/
√
2
|1z〉 ≡ |01〉Fa |1x〉 ≡ (|10〉Fa−|01〉Fa)/
√
2 .
We complete the description of the protocol (namely, how
the above states evolve through the interferometer and
measured by Bob) after discussing the spaces H˜A, H˜anc,
and H˜ , and the inclusion I ofHA into H˜A⊗H˜anc. Then,
we define IB, the interferometer transformation on H˜
(which also includesHA), and explain Bob’s measurement
process.
2. The embedding ofHA and the relevant spaces
As explained above, the states sent by Alice are in the
space HA spanned by {|10〉Fa, |01〉Fa} where the Fock oc-
cupancy numbers are for times t ′0 and t
′
1 and the arm is the
a arm. However, a simple analysis of Fig. 3 shows that
a photon entering at time t ′−1 might also end up at time
mode t0 at either the s or d arms; Similarly, a photon at
input time t ′2 may also end up at output time mode t2 in
either arm. Moreover, the way the interferometer evolves
pulses at time mode t ′n depends on the pulses of times t ′n+1
and t ′n−1. Thus, in order to understand how a (non–empty)
pulse at time t ′−1 evolves through the interferometer, we
must additionally consider time mode t ′−2. Similarly, since
our analysis uses non-empty pulses time mode t ′2 we will
need to add the time mode t ′3. We remark that time modes
t ′−2 and t
′
3 will always be empty, i.e., contain a vacuum
state, however they are needed for the validity of the uni-
tary map.
Let us now define the embedding I = IancIA of Al-
ice’s space into H˜A⊗ H˜anc. Alice’s inputs are embedded
into H˜A, the span of
|010000〉Fa ≡ |t ′−1〉a, |001000〉Fa ≡ |t ′0〉a,
|000100〉Fa ≡ |t ′1〉a, |000010〉Fa ≡ |t ′2〉a, and
|000000〉Fa ≡ |V 〉a,
where the Fock occupancy numbers in this case correspond
to times t ′−2 to t
′
3 respectively in the a arm: e.g., |010000〉Fa
is one photon at time t ′−1 in the a arm and |000010〉Fa is a
photon at time t ′2. Alice inclusion is then given by
IA|10〉Fa = |t ′0〉a and IA|01〉Fa = |t ′1〉a.
The ancillary space H˜anc, given by the b arm, is similarly
defined as the span of
|010000〉Fb ≡ |t ′−1〉b, |001000〉Fb ≡ |t ′0〉b,
|000100〉Fb ≡ |t ′1〉b, |000010〉Fb ≡ |t ′2〉b, and
|000000〉Fb ≡ |V 〉b,
with the same convention on times. The inclusion Ianc
merely describes the addition of an ancillary vacuum state
in the b arm, thus for n ∈ {0,1} we have Ianc|t ′n〉a =
|t ′n〉a|V 〉b (this can be extended to −1≤ n≤ 2).
In the following, the states |an〉, |bn〉 ∈ H˜A⊗ H˜anc are
defined as |an〉 = |t ′n〉a|V 〉b, and |bn〉 = |V 〉a|t ′n〉b. We shall
take H˜ to be the span of all the states |an〉 and |bn〉 with
−1 ≤ n ≤ 2, as these are enough to span Bob’s reversed
space (Table III).
The interferometer induces a unitary embedding IB de-
fined on H˜ ; it takes 12 input modes (where times t−2
and t3 being systematically void) and thus produces 12 out-
put modes. The output is embedded in a space spanned by
all the states of at most a single photon in one of the follow-
ing 12 modes: times t−2 to t3 in the s arm and time t−1 to t3
in the d arm. Similar to the naming convention above, we
use the states |sn〉 and |dn〉with−2≤ n≤ 3 to denote a sin-
9gle photon at time tn in the s and d arms respectively, and
no photons in all other modes. For instance, the state |s3〉
represents one photon at time t3 in the s arm, and vacuum
in all other modes; |d0〉 has a photon at time t0 in the d arm,
and vacuum everywhere else.
Recall that Alice and Bob use the x and z bases encoded
as follows:
I|0z〉= |a0〉 I|0x〉= (|a0〉+ |a1〉)/
√
2
I|1z〉= |a1〉 I|1x〉= (|a0〉− |a1〉)/
√
2 .
Taking the four possible paths for a pulse in the inter-
ferometer, and taking into account the delay and the beam-
splitter’s phase factors, gives the following resulting states
IB|a0〉= (|s0〉− |s1〉 + i|d0〉+ i|d1〉 )/2
IB|a1〉= ( |s1〉− |s2〉 + i|d1〉+ i|d2〉)/2,
(5)
which correspond to the output of the interferometer when
Alice sends |0z〉 and |1z〉, respectively. The output of the
interferometer when Alice sends |0x〉 and |1x〉 is the fol-
lowing linear combinations of the right-hand side of (5):
IBI|0x〉= (|s0〉 − |s2〉+ i|d0〉+2i|d1〉+ i|d2〉)/
√
8
IBI|1x〉= (|s0〉−2|s1〉+ |s2〉+ i|d0〉 − i|d2〉)/
√
8.
(6)
In order to perform a measurement, Bob looks at his de-
tectors at times t0, t1 and t2, and writes down the mode that
is occupied, that is, he measures the basis B = {|s0〉, |s1〉,
|s2〉, |d0〉, |d1〉, |d2〉
}
. Bob then interprets his measurement
in a manner depicted in the following Table VI.
State measured Meaning
|s0〉 or |d0〉 (z,0)
|s2〉 or |d2〉 (z,1)
|d1〉 (x,0)
|s1〉 (x,1)
TABLE VI. Bob’s interpretation of measured state
Bob’s measurement space is thusHB = Span(B). From
equations (5) and (6), The probabilities of Bob getting
each output on each state received from Alice are given
in Table VII.
(z,0) (z,1) (x,0) (x,1)
|0z〉 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
|1z〉 0 1/2 1/4 1/4
|0x〉 1/4 1/4 1/2 0
|1x〉 1/4 1/4 0 1/2
TABLE VII. The probability that Bob measures each outcome in
the interferometric BB84 for each state sent by Alice
Consequently, if Alice encoded her bit in basis b∈ {z,x}
and Bob measures (b,q) then they share bit q; if Bob does
not get the basis used by Alice, the bit he gets is equally
likely 0 or 1.
3. A fixed apparatus attack
If Eve controls the b arm, the above realization is to-
tally insecure. If that input is left open, the apparatus is
completely symmetric; however, since a reflection causes a
phase factor of i, the reverse direction gives a factor of −i.
Taking the detour back also decreases time instead of in-
creasing it. Thus, if Eve wants to force Bob to measure,
say, |s1〉, she only needs to set as input of Bob’s apparatus
the state
(|a1〉− |a0〉− i|b1〉− i|b0〉)/2.
That state can be calculated in the same way as (5) but go-
ing backwards in Fig. 3, starting from |s1〉.
More generally, rewriting equations (5) for an arbitrary
time −1 ≤ n ≤ 2 gives the unitary embedding IB on the
entire H˜ :
IB|an〉= ( |sn〉− |sn+1〉+ i|dn〉+ i|dn+1〉)/2
IB|bn〉= (i|sn〉+ i|sn+1〉− |dn〉+ |dn+1〉)/2 (7)
(in addition to the case where vacuum goes to vacuum).
The map I†B is defined on B (and thusHB) by the formulas
I†B|sn〉= ( |an〉− |an−1〉− i|bn〉− i|bn−1〉)/2
I†B|dn〉= (−i|an〉− i|an−1〉− |bn〉+ |bn−1〉)/2.
(8)
One can easily verify for any |r〉 ∈ B that the state
|r〉R = I†B|r〉 given by Eq. (8) satisfies IB|r〉R = |r〉 (thus for
any |r〉 ∈HB, it holds that IBI†B|r〉 = |r〉). It follows that
an eavesdropper can force the measurements |r〉 by sim-
ply inputting the states |r〉R given in Table III, and thus
fully breaking the protocol. These states also span Bob’s
reversed spaceH RB .
4. Restricting inputs to H˜{0,1} i.e. times 0 and 1
Bob has a very simple counter-measure for the above at-
tack, which we now explain. Assume Eve measures Al-
ice’s state using the basis B and gets |d0〉. She now needs
to generate the state (−i|a0〉− i|a−1〉− |b0〉+ |b−1〉)/2 to
force a measurement of |d0〉. However, this superposition
uses pulses at time t ′−1, which are not used in the original
protocol. Therefore, if Bob adds a shutter that blocks any
inputs to his device except for times t ′0 and t
′
1, he overcomes
this attack.
We now put a more stringent condition on the inputs:
they need to be in H˜{0,1} = Span(|a0〉, |a1〉, |b0〉, |b1〉), i.e.
only occupy times t ′0 and t
′
1. To allow an attack, we use the
assumption that Bob does not check the individual outputs
in B but rather only takes into account the relevant outputs
for the protocol, as given in Table VI. The reason being
that if Alice sends |0z〉 or |1z〉 and Bob measures (z,0) or
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(z,1) then they share a bit. Similarly if Alice sends |0x〉
or |1x〉 and Bob gets output (x,0) or (x,1) then they share
a bit. It is also easy to check that the probability that Bob
gets the same basis as Alice is 1/2 and when the bases are
different, the bit obtained by Bob is random so that this
protocol closely corresponds to the BB84 protocol.
Clearly H˜{0,1} ⊆ H˜ and thus IB is defined on H˜{0,1}.
Moreover, measurements (x,0) and (x,1) correspond to ba-
sis states |d1〉 and |s1〉 and can only be produced inputting
the states I†B|d1〉 and I†B|s1〉 (with a global phase) found
previously. Those are already elements of H˜{0,1}.
Measurement (z,0) my be obtained by inputing any
superposition of I†B|s0〉 and I†B|d0〉 and it is clear from
Table III that
1√
2
I†B (|s0〉+ i|d0〉) = 1√2(|a0〉− i|b0〉) ∈ H˜{0,1}.
Applying IB to that states gives the state 1√2(|s0〉+ i|d0〉)
which gives output (z,0).
Similarly, in order to force a measurement of (z,1), using
the same table we see that
−I†B|s2〉+ iI†B|d2〉= |a1〉+ i|b1〉 ∈ H˜{0,1}
and the attack in Table VIII gives full information to Eve
without affecting Bob’s statistics given the current specifi-
cation.
State Eve can send Bob’s output
(|a0〉− i|b0〉)/
√
2 (z,0)
(|a1〉+ i|b1〉)/
√
2 (z,1)
(|a1〉+ |a0〉− i|b1〉+ i|b0〉)/2 (x,0)
(|a1〉− |a0〉− i|b1〉− i|b0〉)/2 (x,1)
TABLE VIII. A fixed-apparatus attack restricted to H˜{0,1}
Finally, recall that if there is no eavesdropping (no noise
and no loss), if Alice sends |0z〉 and Bob gets output (z,0),
then it is equally likely that he measured the state |s0〉
or |d0〉. Similarly, if Bob gets output (z,1), it is equally
likely that he measured |s2〉 or |d2〉. We note that also
those statistics are preserved if Eve performs the attack of
Table VIII on H˜{0,1}.
